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in the reformatory under the 1917 statute was a sentence to im-
prisonment of the kind meant by the Immigration Act. Subse-
quent amendments to the Illinois statute, however, have placed
emphasis on the idea of reformation, rather than on punishment,
of convicts 3 so it would seem possible, if the question should
arise again, that a period of imprisonment in the reformatory
under the present law might be regarded as being insufficient for
this purpose. Multiple sentences of an alien youth to the Illinois
reformatory, even for crimes involving moral turpitude, may not,
therefore, be sufficient to subject him to deportation.
V. FAMILY LAW
Most current issues relating to family law grow from attempts
to enforce the obligation to pay alimony. For example, the prob-
lem of whether or not a property settlement agreement calling for
the payment of a definite sum of money by installments, when
incorporated into a divorce decree, amounts to a lump sum settle-
ment or is merely a provision for periodic alimony has again
come before the courts during the survey period. The first case,
that of Coleman v. Coleman,' decided by the Appellate Court for
the Fourth District, was one in which the ex-husband petitioned
for cancellation of the agreement on the ground of the remarri-
age of his former wife. He relied on Section 18 of the Divorce
Act as it read prior to its amendment. 2 His petition was countered
with the claim that the agreement was a lump sum settlement,
hence not subject to modification, or if found to be wanting as a
lump sum settlement, was not affected because the 1949 amend-
ment applied.3 The court ruled for the defendant, holding that
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 2, Ch. 118, § 13.1, establishing the Illinois State
Reformatory at Sheridan, announces it to be purpose of such reformatory to provide
a place for the "confinement and rehabilitation of n~ale persons" under seventeen at
the time of conviction and sentence for felonies.
1341 Il. App. 462, 94 N. E. (2d) 507 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 280 and 45 Ill. L. Rev. 805.
2 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 40, § 19.
3 Laws 1949, p. 729, S.B. 175; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19. The amend-
ment provided that ". . . a party shall not be entitled to alimony and maintenance
after remarriage; but, regardless of remarriage by such party or death of either
party, such party shall be entitled to receive the unpaid installments of any settle-
ment in lieu of alimony ordered to be paid or conveyed in the decree."
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the 1949 amendment did not possess retroactive effect, that the
agreement was but one for the payment of alimony,4 and that the
remarriage of the alimony recipient terminated the obligation
to make further payments.
The second case, that of Walters v. Walters,5 was one in
which the facts were closely analogous to those presented in the
Coleman case6 and the matter also arose before the 1949 amend-
ment. The trial court had there granted relief to the defendant
but the Appellate Court for the First District had reversed as
it regarded the agreement to be one for a lump sum settlement,
so not subject to modification. The opinion of the Appellate
Court attracted attention not only because of the majority view
as to the nature of the agreement but also for the strength of
Judge Niemeyer's concurring opinion which argued for the
adoption of the view that a statute, as amended, should have
been applied.
On further appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on
the ground that the nature of the contract and the intention of
the parties was such as to make it a true lump sum property
settlement. In an effort to distinguish the case from the rule
previously announced in Adler v. Adler,7 and the supposed re-
affirmation thereof by reason of a refusal to grant leave to appeal
in Banck v. Balack,8 the court said the rule was one, at least in
cases prior to the amendment of 1949, that where it clearly ap-
peared the order was for support and sustenance of the spouse,
and the provision therefor was plainly separable from the prop-
erty provisions, "the total award, when it is so payable in install-
ments, is modifiable at any time upon a proper showing." But,
where the provision for money payments was so tied in with the
4 Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940).
5409 Ill. 298, 99 N. E. (2d) 342 (1951), affirming 341 Ill. App. 561, 94 N. E. (2d)
726 (1949), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 279 and 45 Ill. L. Rev. 805.
6 The only apparent difference between the two agreements was that the Coleman
agreement was denominated a "property settlement and alimony agreement," while
that in the Waiters case was called a "lump sum property settlement and alimony
in gross."
7373 11l. 361, 26 N. E. (2d) 504 (1940).
8322 Ill. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944), noted in 22 CImcAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEw 276.
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balance of the agreement that it could not be separated therefrom
without doing violence "to the very terms of the agreement it-
self, ' ' 9 the contract had to be construed as a whole and effect
given to every word and part.10 It pointed out that specific
performance had been agreed upon by the parties and that the
plaintiff had executed all necessary instruments required of her.
Having so performed, she was entitled to full performance from
the defendant. The question of the retroactive effect of the 1949
amendment was brushed aside as being unnecessary to the deci-
sion. The important issue, therefore, still remains undetermined.
Collateral attacks upon divorce decrees more often fail than
succeed. Such was the fate suffered in Steffens v. Steiffens,"
wherein plaintiff had been granted a divorce in 1946 and some
two years later the defendant petitioned to vacate the decree on
the alleged ground that the plaintiff had not satisfied jurisdic-
tional requirements as to residence12 and he and his witness had
testified falsely on the point. A motion to strike the petition
was sustained and the Appellate Court affirmed. The record,
on leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, showed that the com-
plaint, charging desertion, alleged a compliance with residence
requirements; that defendant had been served by publication but
had filed an appearance and an answer which neither admitted
nor denied the allegation of residence but demanded strict proof
thereof; that neither the defendant nor her attorneys were present
in court at the hearing but proof was made as to the residential
requirement; and that, soon thereafter, a decree was entered
which recited that the plaintiff had been "an actual resident of
Cook County and . . . of the State of Illinois for over one
year next preceding the filing of the complaint." The upper court
stated it to be clear law in Illinois that, in case of a collateral
attack, "all presumptions are in favor of the validity of the judg-
9409 Ill. 298 at 302, 99 N. E. (2d) 342 at 344-5.
10 The court found the agreement to be almost analogous to the one present in
Kohl v. Kohl, 330 Ill. App. 284, 71 N. E. (2d) 358 (1947).. That agreement had
been held to be a true property settlement contract, hence not subject to modification.
11408 Ill. 150, 96 N. E. (2d) 458 (1951), affirming 338 Ill. App. 599, 88 N. E. (2d)
502 (1949).
12 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 3.
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ment or decree attacked and want of jurisdiction to enter the
same must appear on the face of the record to furnish the basis
for such attack."'1 3 It noted that while language of the Appel-
late Court in the case of In re Goldberg's Estate14 seemed to
be at odds with that rule, the fact that leave to appeal as well as
certiorari had been denied 15 was no indication that the two
high courts approved the opinion therein in its entirety. It also
noted that other cases cited by the defendant 16 were cases which
fell within a recognized exception to the general rule. The fraud
in those cases had deprived the other party of an opportunity
to be heard. As no such fraud was present in the instant case,
the action in striking the petition to vacate the decree was
affirmed.
An unusual attempt by divorced parties to avoid the decree
and to remarry themselves was indicated under the facts of
Meyer v. Meyer.17 The case was one in which, some ten months
after an absolute divorce had been granted, the parties jointly
petitioned the court to vacate the decree on the ground they had
become reconciled. The trial court obligingly did so without
giving heed to the question as to whether it had jurisdiction to do
so or not.'8 The parties resumed cohabitation and so continued
for approximately three years when the ex-husband died. The
alleged widow, following renunciation of the provisions of the
will, sought to partition certain land belonging to the decedent
but her action was defeated in the trial court on the ground, that
she was not, at the time of decedent's death, his lawful wife, hence
acquired no rights in the property. The Supreme Court affirmed
the holding with a note to the effect that the parties may have
conferred in personam jurisdiction on the divorce court by their
13 See Parsons v. Lurie, 400 Ill. 498, 81 N. E. (2d) 182 (1948): Prewitt v. Prewitt,
397 Ill. 178, 73 N. E. (2d) 312 (1947) ; Cullen v. Stevens, 389 Il1. 35, 58 N. E. (2d)
456 (1944).
14 288 I1. App. 203, 5 N. E. (2d) 863 (1937).
15302 U. S. 693, 58 S. Ct. 12, 82 L. Ed. 535 (1937).
16 See Caswell v. Caswell, 120 Ii. 377. 11 N. E. 342 (1887) : Howard v. Howard,
304 Ill. App. 637, 26 N. E. (2d) 421 (1940).
17 409 111. 316, 99 N. E. (2d) 137 (1951).
18 Finality to judgments, upon the expiration of thirty days after rendition, is
given by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 77, § 82. Proceedings to vacate, after that
time, could be conducted only pursuant to ibid., Ch. 110, § 196.
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acts but lacked the ability to give it jurisdiction in law to vacate
the decree of divorce. It answered an argument based on a public
policy in favor of reconstituting broken homes by saying the
parties could have been remarried had they wished. It also
stressed a counter public policy in favor of the finality of divorce
decrees.
Another case bearing the same name, but involving different
parties, that of Meyer v. Meyer,19 was concerned with the ques-
tion as to whether or not cohabitation under a purported second
marriage, rendered void by the vacation of an earlier divorce
decree, was adulterous in character so as to permit the originally
unsuccessful spouse to sue for divorce on that ground. The Ap-
pellate Court for the First District held that such was not the
case as there was no intent, during the period while the earlier
divorce decree remained in existence, to commit adultery and that
cohabitation ceased as soon as the earlier decree was vacated. It
drew a distinction between the case before it and the situation
presented in Gordon v. Gordon20 on the basis that the cohabitation
there found to be adultery had occurred under a marriage con-
tracted prior to the rendition of, but on a false belief of the
entry of, the divorce decree. The court preferred, instead, the
views expressed in the New York case of Bailey v. Bailey.21
The degree of full faith and credit to be given to a divorce
decree still remains a problem according to the case of Sutton
v. Lieb.22 An ex-wife there sued to recover unpaid installments
of alimony under a 1939 Illinois divorce decree which directed
that such payments were to continue "for so long as the plain-
tiff shall remain unmarried." The defendant relied on the fact
that, in July, 1944, plaintiff had married one Walter Henzel in
Reno, Nevada, immediately following the entry of a Nevada de-
cree divorcing Henzel from his wife Dorothy, a New York resi-
dent. It further appeared that, not long after that divorce,
19 343 Ii. App. 554, 99 N. E. (2d) 706 (1951).
20 141 Ill. 160, 30 N. E. 446, 21 L. R. A. 387 (1892).
2145 Hun 278 (1887), affirmed in 142 N. Y. 632, 37 N. E. 566 (1894).
22 188 F. (2d) 766 (1951), affirming 91 F. Supp. 937 (1951). It is understood that
certiorari has been granted.
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Dorothy Henzel sued Walter in New York for separate mainte-
nance and obtained a decree on the basis that the Nevada divorce
was void. The plaintiff, in the meantime, had left Henzel
promptly on learning of Dorothy's suit and had also sued Henzel,
in New York, for an annulment. She also received a favorable
decree which she followed up with a demand on the defendant
here to pay back alimony from 1944 to the date of her valid re-
marriage, to still another in 1947. The lower federal court, in a
suit based on diversity of citizenship, decided for defendant be-
cause of an alleged settlement and release. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, rejecting the theory of a release,2 3 went
to the heart of the issue as to the effect to be given to the
Nevada marriage.
Whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to recover the back
alimony was said to depend upon the validity of the Nevada
marriage which, in turn, depended upon the validity of the Henzel
divorce decree rendered by that state. The court was unable to
find any case wherein the Supreme Court of the United States
had laid down a precise and definite rule as to the status to be
given a decree in the state of its rendition following a successful
attack upon that decree in a sister state. It professed, however,
an ability to see, from remarks of the various justices concerned
with the two Williams cases, 24 a basis of authority for the assump-
tion that such a decree remains in full force and effect in the
state of .its rendition until it has been successfully attacked there.
As the Nevada decree had not been overthrown in Nevada, the
court had no difficulty in finding that plaintiff's marriage was
valid in that state and, therefore, effective to discharge the ali-
mony obligation set forth in the earlier Illinois decree, notwith-
standing the annulment of that marriage by a decree of a New
York court. It, of course, did not decide what the consequence
would have been if the alimony recipient had, in fact, contracted
23 It was said that, in truth, there had been no compromise as the defendant had
merely paid an amount then due. In that regard, see San Fillippo v. San Fillippo,
340 Ill. App. 353, 92 N. E. (2d) 201 (1950).
24 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279,
143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942), and 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 157 (1945).
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no more than a void marriage. That issue, therefore, remains to
be settled in Illinois.25
Another aspect of full faith and credit arose, in Tailby v.
Tailby,26 over an issue as to whether or not an Illinois court
would have the power to enforce a foreign decree for alimony
by punishing the recalcitrant party for contempt. The trial court
had there permitted the plaintiff to set up the unpaid installments
of a New York alimony decree as a foreign judgment, and author-
ized recovery of the same as in a suit in debt on a judgment, but
denied that it had the power to enforce the foreign decree by
means of contempt process. On appeal by plaintiff, the Appel-
late Court for the Third District affirmed. It chose the position
it did in reliance on language of the Illinois Supreme Court, in
Clubb v. Club b, 27 wherein it was pointed out that the jurisdiction
of Illinois courts, in divorce cases and all matters relating thereto,
was purely statutory and did not rest upon general equity powers.
The ruling, however, is in direct conflict with the one handed down
by the Appellate Court for the Second District in Rule v. Rule.28
It should be noted that the Clubb case involved the attempted
enforcement of an English divorce decree which would not, as
such, be entitled to full faith and credit, whereas the Rule case
dealt with a decree from an American state. Only a decision
by the Illinois Supreme Court in a case dealing squarely with
the issue in the Rule and Tailby cases will set the matter to rest.
Until it is so settled, it would seem as if the holding in the Rule
case is the more desirable one, particularly since the problem is
not the narrow one of local enforcement of a foreign divorce
decree but part of a much larger one of the right of a court of
equity to aid in the enforcement of any equitable decree of a
sister state.
25 The closest case would seem to be People ex rel. Byrnes v. Retirement Board,
272 Ill. App. 59 (1933), wherein a pension in favor of a fireman's widow was ordered
restored after a purported remarriage had been annulled by judicial decree which
treated the supposed remarriage as being void ab initio. But see Schleicher v.
Schleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501 (1929), to the effect that the alimony obliga-
tion Is merely suspended by the presence of a voidable marriage.
26 342 Ill. App. 664, 97 N. E. (2d) 611 (1951), noted in 1 DePaul L. Rev. 147.
27 402 Il1. 390, 84 N. E. (2d) 366 (1949).
28313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N. E. (2d) 379 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KErNT LAw
REvnw 46.
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Inter-family matters beside divorce and alimony were also
considered. An attempt was made, in the wrongful death action
entitled Welch v. Davis, 29 to break through the generally accepted
doctrine that no civil suit, other than one for divorce or separate
maintenance, will lie in favor of one spouse against the other
on the basis of physical harm inflicted during coverture. The
case was one in which a husband had shot his wife to death and
thereafter killed himself. The wife left a minor dependent
daughter by a former marriage to survive her and a wrongful
death suit was instituted by the wife's administrator against the
executor of the husband's estate to recover damages for the
benefit of the dependent child. A verdict was reached in favor of
the plaintiff but the trial court granted defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Appellate Court for
the Third District, on appeal by the wife's administrator, affirmed
the holding on the ground that no damage suit could have been
maintained by the wife if she had survived, 0 hence none could
be brought on behalf of the child as the claim was essentially
derivative in nature.
Issues concerning parental rights in relation to adoption were
involved in the case of Dickholtz v. Littfin.31 It became necessary
there to decide whether a consent to adoption given by a natural
parent, in conformity with statutory requirements, 3 2 could be
revoked at the wish of the consenting party prior to the time
when court action had been taken thereon. The Appellate Court
for the First District approved the trial court's action in per-
mitting the withdrawal of the consent as a matter of sound judi-
cial discretion, thereby removing the foundation to the adoption
29 342 Ill. App. 69, 95 N. E. (2d) 108 (1950).
30 The court relied on language in the Injuries Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
Ch. 70, § 1, to the effect that liability for wrongful death attaches only when the
"act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the
party injured to maintain an action." It distinguished the case of Kaczorowski v.
Kalkosinski, 321 Pa. 438, 184 A. 663, 104 A. L. 'R. 1267 (1936), on the basis of a
difference in the two statutes, and preferred to rest its holding on views expressed
in Hovey v. Dolmage, 203 Iowa 231, 212 N. W. 553 (1927), and in Demos v. Freemas,
43 Ohio App. 426, 183 N. E. 395 (1931).
31341 11. App. 400, 94 N. E. (2d) 89 (1950), noted in 29 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 183.
32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 3-6.
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proceeding. It did note, however, that there was no positive
right to revoke a consent which had once been given.33 The case
is significant, therefore, in that a decision on that point would
place Illinois in line with the majority view on the subject3 4
Questions involving the law applicable to the contractual
relationships of infants seldom reach reviewing courts today.
Exceptions do crop up, however, and the case of Shepherd v.
Shepherd35 is such a case. The suit was one to rescind a deed
given by a minor. It was filed about seven months after the
minor became of age. The relief sought was denied by the trial
court and, a freehold being involved, the case went on direct
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. The decree was there
affirmed on the basis that the plaintiff had ratified his deed be-
cause he had failed to act promptly to disaffirm on reaching his
majority. The law is that a minor's deed is not void but void-
able, hence will become valid and binding if ratified by the minor
on coming of age.36 It is also the general rule that, on the attain-
ment of majority, a party is allowed a reasonable time in which
to disaffirm.3 7  The duration of that period has been said to be
one resting on the particular facts.3" In the instant case, the
period elapsing between plaintiff's majority and the attempt to
disaffirm was but seven months and, in truth, it could be said he
had done little, if anything, after reaching twenty-one to estab-
lish an intent to ratify. In fact, the Illinois cases cited by the
court in support of its decision certainly show acts of affirmance
far stronger than those relied on in the instant case. 39 It remains
to be seen whether or not the applicable law has been modified
by this decision, but it would seem as if adults who wish to dis-
affirm contracts entered into during minority will have to act
33 To that extent, it rejected dicta in Petition of Thompson, 337 Il. App. 354,
86 N. E. (2d) 155 (1949), noted in 27 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 308.
34 See annotations in 156 A. L. R. 1011 and 138 A. L. R. 1038.
35408 Ill. 364, 97 N. E. (2d) 273 (1951), noted in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
361.
36 Schlig v. Spear, 345 I1i. 219, 177 N. E. 730 (1931) ; Barlow v. Robinson, 174
Ill. 317, 51 N. E. 1045 (1898).
37 43 C. J. S., Infants, § 40.
38 Rubin v. Strandberg, 288 Il1. 64, 122 N. E. 808, 5 A. L. R. 133 (1919).
39 See cases cited in notes 36 and 38, ante.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
with lightning speed and, having attained majority, must avoid
the slightest conduct which could be construed as to show ratifi-
cation.
Significant changes have been made in the field by legislative
enactments. One such would eliminate the rule laid down in
Floberg v. Floberg.40  It had there been held that time spent
apart during the pendency of an earlier divorce or separate main-
tenance action was not to be counted toward the fulfillment of
the statutory requirement of a full year of desertion for the pur-
pose of obtaining a divorce on that ground. The law would ap-
pear to be that such time of enforced separation is not to be
subtracted in the computation of the desertion period.41 A change
has also been made in the requirement relating to residence for
divorce purposes. Prior to the amendment, it was possible to
obtain a divorce in Illinois, even though both parties to the action
were non-residents and without any period of residence whatever,
provided that the act charged was committed within the state.42
It will no longer be possible to do so as a residence of at least
six months by one or the other of the parties is now required.43
Perhaps of more consequence, however, is the legislative action
in amending that portion of the statute relating to the support
and maintenance of a wife or children.44 By making the act
apply in cases of need rather than destitution, by putting teeth
in the provisions covering the temporary support order, by ex-
tending the possible duration of the final support order to three
years instead of one, and by vesting the court with power to re-
quire an assignment of wages or salary in excess of $20 per week
if other satisfactory security is not offered, the law makers have
immeasurably increased the effectiveness of the statute.45
40 358 Il1. 626, 193 N. E. 456 (1934).
41 Laws 1951, p. 1305, S.B. 135; I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 1.
42 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 3.
43 Laws 1951, p. 1922, S.B. 216; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 3.
44 Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, § 1 et seq.
45 Laws 1951, p. 1950, H.B. 703; I1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, §§ 24, 26 and
27. It is also proper to note the passage of Laws 1951, p. 1563, H.B. 245, which is
the same as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 68, §§ 17, 18, 20 and 21, for the purposes
of bringing the terminology of the Husband and Wife Act into conformity with the
language of the Mental Health Code: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 91%, § 1
et seq.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1950-1951
VI. PROPERTY
MEAL AND PERSONAL PROPBRTY
Without doubt, the most noteworthy development in the law
of real property is the action taken by the legislature with regard
to methods of conveyancing. By the deletion of a few words
from the Conveyances Act, the legislature has brought an end to
ancient doctrines relating to the use of private seals in the case
of such instruments as contracts, deeds, mortgages and the like.1
While the use of a private seal is not forbidden, and will prob-
ably continue to be so used by lawyers who slavishly follow older
forms or who have established almost automatic habits of dicta-
tion, seals are no longer necessary nor will the presence thereof
in any way change the construction to be given to legal instru-
ments. It would appear, therefore, that subterfuge of the type
previously practice2 should no longer be necessary. It yet
remains to be seen, however, whether common law doctrines
relating to procedural distinctions between sealed and unsealed
contracts will follow in the train of the changes so made with
relation to deedsA
Lesser questions of real property law have been settled by/
the courts. Two oil and gas cases, for example, might be said
to possess significance. In one of them, that of United States v.
Illinois Central Railroad Company,4 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a decision of a federal district court
which had held that the nature of the grant of public lands to the
railroad company was such as to permit it to extract oil and gas
1 Laws 1951, p. 1297, H.B. 923; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, §§ 1, 9, 10, 11
and 26. A companion measure, Laws 1951, p. 1299, H.B. 924, adds Section 153b to
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 30, although, in scope, it may have been intended
to have more direct bearing in relation to contracts.
2 See Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 416, S.B. 450, same as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
Ch. 30, § 34a, which enacted the fiction that a recital of sealing, in the body or in
the acknowledgment of any deed, resulted in the adoption of any seal appearing
thereon, including that of the notary public! The reason for this queer provision
is explained in 30 Ill. B. J. 20, at p. 21, discussing S.B. 450.
3 It has been permissible for many years, in Illinois, to disregard the seal and
to sue as in special assumpsit, even though, in the old days, an action of covenant
would have been more proper: Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540 (1883).
4 187 F. (2d) 374 (1951), affirming 89 F. Supp. 17 (1949), noted in 29 CHICAGO-
KENT LAw REviEw 84.
